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dexterous manual work, causing major structural change in the job
market. As advanced economies shift from a post-industrial to an auto-
industrial model, all kinds of routine work is being replaced by machines.
Mid-range job opportunities are shrinking, and labor markets are polar-
izing. Demand for dexterous service work nevertheless remains strong, as
does demand for abstract labor working with patterns rather than with
rules or procedures. Design is a mid-tier occupation that is growing rather
than declining. “Design” is also a metaphor for abstract labor of all kinds;
it exempliﬁes work that is creative, innovative, problem-solving, and
reliant on judgment rather than rules. Heightened demand for abstract
labor reﬂects the evolving nature of capitalist economies. The contribution
of invention, ingenuity and imagination to the creation of economic value
continues to expand. The auto-industrial era is coeval with design capi-
talism; together they represent a key dimension of future economics.Copyright © 2015, Tongji University and Tongji University Press.
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1 This also means reconceptu-
alizing what capital is. As auto-
industrialism grows, domestic
assets are turned into capital.
The private house is an example
of this. The person who converts
their house (for example) into a
part-time Bed-and-Breakfast is
converting tacit capital into
active capital. This is in contrast
to a person who speculates on
the growth of the capital value of
their house during a speculative
boom. Cars, garages, rooms,
and domestic tools and technol-
ogies are the basis for a growing
independent (or “indie”) capi-
talism. Each of these represents
a form of sleeping capital that is
awoken by owners interested in
various kinds of self-
employment.
2 Today the largest cohorts of
sole proprietors in the United
States are, in descending order
of size: professional scientiﬁc
and technical services (13
percent); services (12 percent);
construction (11 percent);
administration (10 percent);
retail (9 percent); health (9
percent); arts, entertainment
and recreation (6 percent).
Source: Adrian Dungan, “Sole
Proprietorship Returns, 2012,”
Internal Revenue Service
(IRS.gov), accessed December
10, 2015, https://www.irs.gov/
pub/irs-soi/soi-a-inpr-id1503.pdf.
3 Deirdre N. McCloskey, Bour-
geois Dignity (Chicago:University
of Chicago Press, 2010), 1–2;
Thomas Piketty, Capital in the
Twenty-First Century (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press,
2014), 86–90.
4 The term was immortalised
by Robert Hughes in his art-
critical meditation The Shock of
the New: Art and the Century of
Change, enlarged edition
(London: Thames and Hudson,
1991).
5 Peter Murphy, The Collective
Imagination (Farnham, England:
Ashgate, 2012).
6 Murphy, The Collective Imagi-
nation, 149–92.Automation and the Long Stagnation
Modern capitalist economies are based on the paradox that “less is more.” The art
of economizing is to balance increased production with decreased labor input. A
successful modern economy has high levels of productivity; it continually produces
more goods and services while utilizing less labor per unit of production. But using
less labor in this manner creates a conundrum: although increases in productivity
make a society wealthier, if “less labor” means the net stock of work in a society
shrinks, then the general level of social prosperity will reduce. To solve this puzzle,
modern capitalist economies must determine how to increase productivity and
wealth, whilst also ensuring that the beneﬁts produced are broadly available
through work.
Dynamic societies typically deal with this conundrum in two ways. First, they
adjust the relativities between income generated by labor and capital. That is, they
encourage more people to earn income from capital rather than labor, if the
demand for labor declines.1 This is sometimes called “popular capitalism”. This
approach reduces the reliance on wages to distribute the beneﬁts of productivity
gains, and entails more people earning income as freelancers or sole traders, in
partnerships, or as owners of small- and medium-sized businesses. Secondly, dy-
namic societies create new economic sectors and industries. Modern capitalism is
an innovation-propelled economic system: it is creative, and this creativity ex-
presses itself in a number of ways. Productivity, one form of creativity, is based on
ingenuity. To achieve more output with less input requires clever and original
approaches. Devising resourceful ways of producing the same quantity of goods
and services with fewer employees is an inventive form of problem-solving.
However, this is merely one example of the larger wellspring of ingenuity that
successful modern capitalist economies rely upon. Indeed, they have to constantly
engage in an act of double coding: reduce labor input and the time spent on
coordinating labor (managing it and overseeing it) while increasing labor use by
creating unprecedented kinds of industries and economic activities. Alternatively,
if they cannot increase the use of labor in new kinds of industries, then they have
to increase the use of capital such that, whilst fewer personsmay engage in salaried
work or wage work for a living, more individuals engage in “capital work” as
freelancers and sole traders, or in partnerships and the like. “Capital work” rep-
resents the time that the owner of capital spends managing, coordinating, orga-
nizing, and directing an investment or business.2
The increase in wealth and productivity in modern capitalist economies has
been dramatic over the past two hundred years. It has pulled a large portion of the
world’s population out of absolute poverty, and given the citizens of advanced
economies a standard of living unparalleled in human history.3 The economic
advancement of the past two centuries is clearly remarkable, yet it is difﬁcult to
sustain, because by deﬁnition it requires constant innovation.
The enduring bedrock principle of modern capitalism is this ingenuity. It
produces new things, which, if successful, become durable, stable, and permanent
features in the lives of modern people. Often, when such things are ﬁrst experi-
enced, they feel like “the shock of the new,”4 but what at ﬁrst is astonishing
eventually becomes routine. This double-edged quality of modern capitalism is one
key to its success. The idea of the “double edge” is in fact very much like creativity
itself. What the act of creation does is to join together what ordinarily is set apart.5
A core difﬁculty modern economies share is the need to be continuously
creative, which is more or less impossible in a literal sense. This means that
modern capitalism is not progressive, but rather cyclical:6 it goes up and down and
up and down, rather than operating along a straight line of improvement. When itDesign Capitalism 141
7 Peter Murphy, “The Enigma of
Capitalism and the French Cul-
de-Sac,” Thesis Eleven: Critical
Theory and Historical Sociology
124, no. 1 (2014): 71–89.
8 Doesn’t this exclude the least
skilled? In major economies
today, even the poor and low-
income classes have assets.
Capital is a matter of waking
assets from their slumber and
putting them to work to earn
income. Rector and Shefﬁeld
(2011) report that 99.9 percent
of US households have a refrig-
erator; 98.7 percent a television;
98.5 percent a stove or oven;
87.9 percent a microwave and
84.0 percent air conditioning.
The ﬁgures for poor US house-
holds are not much different:
99.6 percent have a refrigerator;
97.7 percent a television; 97.7
percent a stove or oven; 81.4
percent a microwave and 78.3
percent air conditioning. See
Robert Rector and Rachel Shef-
ﬁeld, “Air Conditioning, Cable
TV, and an Xbox: What is
Poverty in the United States
Today? Backgrounder #2575 on
Poverty and Inequality,” The
Heritage Foundation, July 19,
2011, accessed November 21,
2015, http://www.heritage.org/
research/reports/2011/07/what-
is-poverty.
9 Piketty, Capital in the Twenty-
First Century, 93–96.
10 “…productivity growth in
the service sector has generally
been low (or even zero in some
cases, which explains why this
sector has tended to employ a
steadily increasing share of the
workforce).” Piketty, Capital in
the Twenty-First Century, 90.
11 Peter Murphy, Universities
and Innovation Economies
(Farnham, England: Ashgate,
2014).
142goes up, people expect it to keep going up. When it goes down, the same people
expect it to keep going down. This ideology of progressivism is one of the chief
obstacles to understanding the peculiar dynamics of modern capitalist economies.
In fact, they are neither progressive nor regressive. They do not move in one di-
rection only; they move in two directions, simultaneously. This is an aspect of the
double-coding of modern capitalism.7 Its cyclical nature is a practical form of
economic dual-coding. The downturns of capitalist economies, as stressful as they
might be, are essential sources of the upturns that follow them. Upturns are born
of downturns, and so on. Downturns signal that a generation of innovation has
exhausted its potential.
Economic downturns reduce the demand for labor. Jobs that were previously
thought of as necessary are dispensed with. Once they go, they rarely return to an
economy in the same numbers. Businesses and organizations discover, often
painfully, that they can do more with less. They might not go seeking it, but the
mechanism of economic cycles imposes efﬁciencies on business units. Due to the
pressure of economic circumstances, a business discovers that a new generation of
machines can replace the employees that must be let go when an economic cycle
reaches its lowest point.
Modern capitalism is technological in nature. It is a species of industrialism. It
saves on the cost of labor by using machines. Yet capitalism does not only shed
labor. It also innovates by creating new kinds of work in new industries. For
instance, at one time the automobile industry was a new industry; likewise the
aircraft industry. At ﬁrst their need for labor expanded; then, as they matured and
automated, it reduced. This cycle repeats. The information technology industry in
the 1980s, however, hinted at a different path. While new industries might typi-
cally increase labor demand, IT wage-labor creation might not be on the scale of
the railways or automobile industry. If that was so, then the generation of capital
work might prove to be as crucial as additional wage-work in fresh industries.
Arguably, future employment rests as much on capital work as it does on
newfound wage-and-salary work.8 This supposes that persons switch to earning
from capital rather than labor. Income of this kind includes royalties, dividends,
interest, capital gains, rents, and proﬁts. Arguably it also includes operator sal-
aries, which are deﬁned as business expenditure for tax purposes but are also key
items of income for sole proprietors and partners. Capital work underscores
modern capitalism’s double-coding. It can reduce the demand for labor and in-
crease the demand for work at the same time.
In 2008 the global economy began a long phase of economic stagnation,
characterized by lower growth, lower productivity, stagnant real incomes, a
reduction in economic demand, and the shedding of labor. Even in China, themost
bullish of the major world economies, growth declined. The period of global
stagnation was framed by a longer-run decline in productivity and shrinking rates
of economic growth in major economies. This was evident well before the global
downturn of 2008.9High rates of growth enable countries to increase their GDP per
capita. They get richer. With that, social prosperity grows. Lower growth is mani-
fest in the ﬂatlining of real incomes, and unemployment and underemployment.
One explanation of long-term multi-decade declining productivity is the growth of
post-industrial service jobs in advanced economies. These have proved difﬁcult to
make more productive.10 A hairdresser today is not much more productive than
ﬁfty years ago. The growth of the government, education, and health sectors in the
post-industrial era was accompanied by a multiplication of regulations and pro-
cedures. This also stymied productivity gains.11
This scenario may change. While low growth is acutely visible in advanced
economies today, less visible is the accelerating replacement of labor byshe ji The Journal of Design, Economics, and Innovation Vol. 1, No. 2, Winter 2015
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(working paper, National
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Benedikt Frey and Michael A.
Osborne, The Future of Employ-
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Oxford Martin School, 2013),
accessed November 21, 2015,
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Development of Australia
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force? (Melbourne: CEDA, 2015),
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http://www.ceda.com.au/
research-and-policy/policy-
priorities/workforce.
14 Jaimovich and Siu, “Job Po-
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coveries”; David H. Autor, Frank
L. Levy, and Richard J. Murnane,
“The Skill Content of Recent
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Empirical Exploration,” Quar-
terly Journal of Economics 118,
no. 4 (2003): 1279–1333; David
H. Autor, Lawrence F. Katz, and
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15 Digital Government Trans-
formation (Deloitte, 2015), 24,machines.12 Contemporary labor-substitution takes the form of automation,
computerization, and robotics, which are long-existing technologies. Computing
and robotics for example were both well established by the 1950s. In the 2010s,
their labor-replacing power accelerated. This kind of long-run development
punctuated by a late arriving, sharp upswing is true of many major technology
impacts. Rarely are they overnight stories. In fact, automation is as old as indus-
trialism. What is interesting about the post-2008 acceleration of automation is its
focus: routine work on a large-scale, including both repetitive manual work in the
case of robotics; and repetitive, white collar ofﬁce work in the case of computer-
ization. Across themedium term of ten to twenty years (2008–2030), the amount of
routine work expected to be replaced is very large indeed.13 Thirty-to-forty percent
of existing jobs will be affected in major ways, suggesting that, in net terms, as
least 20 percent of existing work will be completely eliminated.
The process of reducing routine work has been going on beneath the eco-
nomic surface in advanced economies since 1990.14 In each succeeding cyclical
downturn since then, another portion of the total volume of repetitive work has
been replaced by machines. This labor-substitution was disguised by the simulta-
neous growth of government and corporate regulation. Productivity gains through
automation were negated by the post-industrial expansion of private and public
bureaucracies. As government, health and education sectors, and corporations
became more efﬁcient, they also became less efﬁcient. In the 1980s, socialism as
political idea collapsed in many countries. After that, though, regulation ﬂour-
ished. The aggressive expansion of regulation in advanced economies generated
routine work functions. Checking, auditing, reviewing, inspecting, assessing,
appraising, and examining became the primary growth industry of the 1990s and
2000s inmajor economies. As this was happening, technology was being developed
that would eventually automate these functions. Today, online processing of
routine customer applications by government is one-thirtieth the cost of
performing the same operation in-person, face-to-face.15 Offshoring the applica-
tion process is, by comparison, only one-ﬁfth of a face-to-face transaction. Conse-
quently, the balance between the multiplication of routine functions and their
automation is now shifting decisively in favor of automation.
In economies like the United States, automating routine work has produced
the phenomenon of “job polarization.” Jobs at the top and bottom ends of the
work-skill spectrum have grown since 1990, while demand for routine mid-tier,
mid-skill work, notably in ofﬁces, has declined—and is projected to decline
further.16 The result has been a hollowing-out of middle class jobs with the pros-
pect that many more such occupations will disappear over the next two decades.
Since 1990, low-income service work has been less affected by automation. It is
often not routine enough to be replaced by the current generation of machines.
But with rapid advances in robotics in the last decade (2006–2016) that is changing.
Wider and wider swathes of routine work of all kinds, manual and non-manual, are
projected to be replaced by machines in the near- and medium-term future. The
scale of replacement is massive.
The execution of a routine task involves repetitious and well-deﬁned steps that
can be easily mimicked by a computer algorithm. Once that has been written, the
work can be done by a machine or machines. Progressively, software is replacing
mid-tier accounting, HR, payroll, tax agent, travel agent, clerical processing, and
numerous similar functions.17 As machine intelligence has improved and sensor
technology has grown cheaper and better, advances in autonomous robotic sys-
tems are replacing ever-increasing numbers of mobile andmanual operations with
machines. Autonomous cars, military vehicles, and aircraft along with domestic,
factory, and hospital robot assistants are appearing. In twenty years’ time, road andDesign Capitalism 143
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18 Deloitte, London Futures, 10,
ﬁgure 4.
19 Piketty, “Capital in the
Twenty-First Century,” ﬁgure
3.5.
20 Amyth is that they have been
unhappy to do so. On the con-
trary, MBO Partners reported
high levels of satisfaction among
sole traders with their circum-
stances. MBO Partners, 2014
State of Independence in America
(Hendon, VA.: MBO Partners,
2014), accessed November 21,
2015, https://www.mbopartners.
com/state-of-independence/
2014-state-of-independence.
21 Data source: Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) Sole
Proprietorship Returns 1996 and
2012. See Therese Cruciano,
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1996” Internal Revenue Service
(IRS.gov), accessed December
10, 2015, https://www.irs.gov/
pub/irs-soi/96solp.pdf; Dungan,
“Sole Proprietorship Returns,
2012.”
22 This represents an average of
$55,000 a return.
23 The story is similar for part-
nerships. Between 2003 and
2012, the US population grew 8
percent. The number of part-
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144transport systems will be largely driverless and operator-less. People-less systems
of factories-warehousing-transport-retail lie not too far in the future. For the
moment, robots are still poor at carrying out tasks that involve high levels of
manual dexterity. With time the dexterity of machines will grow.
The phenomenon ofmachines replacing labor belongs on what could be called
the “disruptive” side of capitalist innovation. Disruptions contribute to novel
business models and product development, seek to make the production, distri-
bution and allocation of products and services increasingly efﬁcient, and to make
the use of such offerings more pleasurable to a greater number of people. Dis-
ruptions are typically made possible through the use of digital technologies. By
accelerating the pace at which they replace routine work with machine intelli-
gence, advanced economies are swiftly moving from the post-industrial to the auto-
industrial era. The post-industrial era was characterized by the expansion of
“knowledge work”: mid-tier, mid-skill, university-qualiﬁed, information process-
ing ofﬁce-based work. The expansion of such work is over. In London, between 2001
and 2013, 65 percent of library assistants, 48 percent of counter clerks, and 44
percent of PAs disappeared.18
Technology innovation “disrupts” by enabling the performance of existing
functions more cheaply, quickly, and ﬂexibly. The other side of the capitalist
economic cycle is, by contrast, “constructive,” and involves the formation of new
industry sectors, new values, and new demands. Historically, the electricity
utility industry, the railways, the automobile industry, and so on, are examples
of this. What such constructive innovation brings with it is not the replacement
of labor by machines, but rather the invention of newfound work. This is
separate from the creation of fake “make work” by governments eager to quell
social anxiety about automation. Modern economies invent work as well as
replace work by machines. New job categories are being continuously created.
That being said, the creation has to exceed the destruction of jobs in order for
economies to grow.
The alternative to newfound salaried work is capital work. In the major
economies in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, income accruing to capital
(via dividends, rents, proﬁts, interest, royalties, etc.) as a portion of total national
income was signiﬁcant and steady over time. Income generated by capital then
declined sharply in the twentieth century (from 1910 onwards). It grew again after
1970.19 That capital work shrank in the ﬁrst part of the twentieth century is not
surprising. The nineteenth century was the era of liberal capitalism. The ﬁrst half
of the twentieth century was the age of socialism. Socialism despised income from
capital while it eulogized income from wage work. The share of national income in
major economies echoed this political disposition. After 1970, the portion of
income from capital grew again. This in part reﬂected the decline of socialism,
though it equally reﬂected the way in which socialism’s agenda was replaced by
regulation. The post-industrial era saw the proliferation of regulatory and process
bureaucracies. This was the kind of salaried work that delivered few productivity
gains. Accordingly, the income it generated over time stagnated. The tacit response
ofmany individuals to this was tomove away from salaried work.20 This is reﬂected
in the rise in the numbers and the income of sole traders and partnerships. In 1995,
there were 16,423,000 sole proprietor tax returns lodged in the United States.21 In
2012, the number was 23,426,000, an increase of 42 percent in 18 years;22 mean-
while, over the same period, the population of the US increased by 22 percent only.
Over the same interval, the total business receipts of sole traders grew from $807
billion to $1.3 billion, outpacing inﬂation by 7 percent.23 There is every indication
that, in the age of auto-industrialism, capital’s share of income will rise further
still.she ji The Journal of Design, Economics, and Innovation Vol. 1, No. 2, Winter 2015
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Repetitious work is being replaced by algorithms that control databases and
robots. The scope of these algorithms continues to expand. There are arguments
about the limits of machines, but it is fair to say that machines cannot currently
perform “creative” tasks. An algorithm may be complex; a machine may have a
capacity to learn. My household vacuum robot teaches itself the ﬂoor layout and
can adapt to changes in that layout. It learns to avoid new obstacles. This is clever.
But clever is not the same thing as “creative.”What will the work of the future look
like? It will likely become less routine. It will be work that cannot be deﬁned by an
algorithm. It will be less repetitive, predictable or regular in nature. This is work
that has a creative, experimental, problem-solving, or ingenious component, or
else involves a kind of manual dexterity that a machine algorithm cannot easily
mimic or readily reduce to a set of well deﬁned, repeating steps.
Modern capitalism is creative thanks to its double-coding. What I mean by this
is that creative systems, modern capitalism included, interpolate opposites.24 In
other words, capitalism is like art. Cubismmimicked three-dimensional space on a
two-dimensional canvas. René Magritte painted nighttime street scenes with a
daytime sky. Machines are not ironic, ambiguous, incongruous, contradictory, or
paradoxical…but human beings are. This is not a deﬁciency, but rather the great
strength of being human. It is how human beings adapt to all manner of envi-
ronments, places and circumstances. We adapt well because we interpolate op-
posites. We can see that what is down can also be up, as in an M. C. Escher drawing;
or see what is not there, as in Alan Fletcher’s design of the Victoria and Albert
Museum logo.25 This is not simply illusionistic; making sense of these kinds of
things is central to human cognitive functioning. This cognitive double-coding—to
see, hear or feel one thing as another—is what makes the human imagination
possible.26 When human beings imagine something, they conceive one thing in
terms of another thing. This is the basis of metaphor, analogy, resemblance, sim-
iles, ﬁgurative thought, allegories, and all kinds of powerful images and symbols,
be they visual, aural, textual, or tactile.
Modern capitalism—at its most subtle—is imaginative. This is what propels it
forward. But, as noted, forward also means backwards. Relativity, Escher’s 1953
lithograph print, prompts our eye to follow his stairs upwards. We ascend the
stairs imaginatively only to ﬁnd at a certain point we have been descending the
stairs. The experience of this artwork is uncanny. Capitalist economies are also
uncanny in roughly the same manner. This applies to work as much as to broader
economic cycles. A lot of work is routine. That is to say, it does not have an
imaginative component. In literature, we have many characters carrying out
routine work who daydream. Their work does not require much imagination so the
characters drift into their own reveries. At work, they imagine themselves at the
beach. There is nothing special about this. Everybody has done it. That is also the
nature of the imagination. Everyone has an imagination. Some individuals,
though, are more imaginative than others. The same is true of societies.27 Imagi-
native societies, those that are good at stimulating and harnessing the fruits of the
imagination, do well economically. Organizational and technological invention
drives high-growth economies. Part of invention is the invention of newfound
kinds of work and the fostering of work that has ingenuity as a component.
If machines are replacing well-deﬁned, step-by-step, routine work, what will
employees of the future do? Some predict that “social” jobs, involving a high level
of face-to-face interaction, will survive.28 This expectation is exaggerated. Many
interactions between people are repetitious in nature, as in the case of talking to a
fast-food outlet cashier or a desk clerk in a hotel. Human beings do care deeplyDesign Capitalism 145
29 Murphy, The Collective Imag-
ination, 35–52.
146about personal connections, but not this kind. They care about connections that
are surprising, not in the sense of “shocking, astounding or startling”, but in the
sense that they are not rote. Meaning at its deepest is a function of the imagination.
Repetitious behavior can be meaningful, but only to a point. People derive only a
partial sense of meaning from ritual and the predictable rounds of everyday life:
that the world is not chaotic. But guarantees against a messy, unruly and confused
world do not provide a depth of meaning. They do not tap into profound layers of
meaning. The imagination, by contrast, does this very thing. Using it is what
provides social actors with a durable sense of satisfaction or happiness. Exercising
the imagination puts them in a good place. It consummates, fulﬁlls, and gratiﬁes.
Naturally, this sense of well-being is a personal matter. However, it also has an
economic function. Economies succeed when goods or services generate demand,
and human beings most want goods and services that somehow foster a sense of
consummation, fulﬁllment, and gratiﬁcation.
This happens most often when a good or service has an imaginative compo-
nent. For example, we get service in a restaurant. It is often the case that restaurant
service is most memorable when there is witty banter between the waitress and
the customer. Wit is a function of the imagination.29 We say one thing and mean
another thing. As long as we are in a mood for humor, that is enlivening for
everyone. In contrast, machines are not funny. They are proﬁcient, useful, time-
saving, and labor-saving. But they are not humorous. This is not an argument for a
stand-up comedy economy. Rather it is an illustration of what the imagination
imparts to goods and services. Of course functionality, efﬁciency and ease of use
contribute to our enjoyment and satisfaction. But in addition, the most attractive
goods and services stimulate a lasting memory in people by tapping into our
cognitive capacity to perceive and experience double-coding, be it linguistic,
formal, visual, theoretical, or otherwise. The ability to recognize two-in-one is the
substratum of the human imagination, a thread running between art and design
and (everyday) life. It underscores a more general proposition: the work of the
future will have to be more imaginative, or else it will be turned over to machines.
So what constitutes the imaginative dimension of work? One way of
answering this is to approach the question via a historical metaphor. Four decades
ago a major shift occurred in advanced economies. These economies had large
manufacturing sectors that were in decline. Jobs were either automated or
exported abroad to low-wage countries. The ﬁrst industrial robots were installed in
a Trenton, New Jersey General Motors plant in 1961. This was a sign of things to
come. By the 1970s, factories began move offshore. Today robotic systems are now
so cheap and functional that factories are relocating to the countries they exited
from during the post-industrial era. As the auto-industrial age begins, people-less
factories are springing up along with people-less warehouses. These will be even-
tually integrated with driver-less transport systems. None of this represents an
increase in jobs; quite the contrary. But that is not the full story, for computer-
controlled factories still need to manufacture products. Those products have to
generate demand and satisfaction. A good price, an efﬁcient delivery system, and a
durable artifact are all part of what generates consumer satisfaction; but before all
that, there is the imaginative aspect of the product that draws the user to it.
Goods and services that appeal to the imagination have a way of generating a
deep level of satisfaction. This imaginative element is not a simplematter to deﬁne.
But often a key part of the imaginative component of a good or a service lies in its
design. Design is a loose term for the form, shape, arrangement, pattern, or proﬁle
of a good or service. Design is usually responsible for a product’s durability. Fitness,
form, efﬁciency, and pattern are also closely related. And design is also a surface
quality: for most of us, it is satisfying to look at, listen to, touch or taste its shapeshe ji The Journal of Design, Economics, and Innovation Vol. 1, No. 2, Winter 2015
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35 Isaacson, Steve Jobs, 465–74.and pattern. The satisfaction is sensual, cerebral, and metaphysical. With the
passage of time, of the three key elements that might describe a good or service
(utility, ease of use, and beauty), the element of beauty increases in importance.
If we could plot an arc that spans across the last two hundred years of in-
dustrial capitalism, we would see that the initial interest in industrial-scale goods
and services was weighted toward utility. Does it work?With time the importance of
ease of use or consumption grew. Is its distribution, handling, and performance efﬁcient
and pleasant? As more time passed, the importance of aesthetics increased. Does it
look, feel, or sound good? Does it appeal to my imagination? Utility, ease, and aesthetics
are three dimensions of design. They are co-present in design, though weighted
differently according to circumstance. The shift of consumer bias toward the factor
of aesthetic look-and-feel in goods or services was signaled by the success of Steve
Jobs’Apple Corp in the 1980s.30 Jobs believed that it was the job of his company “to
teach people aesthetics.”31 By no means was the Apple story typical of its time.
Even today Jobs’ meticulous insistence on getting the look of the interior of his
computers “right” is atypical. But Apple’s approach did indicate an increasing
market for everyday aesthetics—itself a function of a larger historical trend. From
1810 to 1897, the usage of the word “design” declined.32 After 1897, it increased—
and notably so after 1936 and again after 1967. The steep rise in the use of the term
after 1967 reﬂects the spread of everyday aesthetics in housing, urbanism, and
retail.33 Various models for everyday aesthetics include the “arts-and-crafts”
movement (1880–1910), the “city beautiful” movement (1890–1910), the “garden
city” movement (1900–1960), Art Deco (1920–1950), the German Bauhaus
(1920–1940), and Fluxus (1957–1978). Little-by-little, aesthetic sensibility has
percolated into everyday life.
At ﬁrst glance, the aesthetics of design and the practical nature of economics
might seem far removed from each other. Yet take the case of Chandigarh, the
Indian city designed by the modernist architect Le Corbusier. The city has the
highest per capita income in India. This, arguably, is no accident. Rather it is a
result of the way in which aesthetics functions as a subtle mode of production. The
contemporary citizens of Chandigarh (India’s “city beautiful”) are testament to
this. They have beneﬁted from the paradoxical entwining of aesthetics and eco-
nomics. Chandigarh enjoys a contemporary growth rate of 8 percent and a per
capita income that is three times India’s national average. Its citizens proﬁt from a
high rate of literacy, there are attractive gardens, and the technology industry is
booming. The city that grew out of Le Corbusier’s 1951 master plan has proved to be
a long-term crucible for economic well-being.34
In a similar manner, there is no better expression of either aesthetic
modernism or the information economy than Jonathan Ive’s design of the iPhone,
a beautiful steel-and-glass handheld tablet.35 This kind of imaginative design of
everyday objects has extended itself inmany directions. The Swedishmanufacturer
Husqvarna produces a popular line of robot motor mowers. As Husqvarna says
about its product: it works, it won’t disturb anyone, and it operates anytime, even
in the dark. What is notable however is not just the fact of automation, but also the
sleek futuristic design of these units, and additionally what customers do by way of
aesthetic add-ons. Owners embellish their mowers with graphic design motifs and
build kennel-like garages for them. The robot making its way home to its docking
station has a pleasingly anthropomorphic quality. The product is functional (it
works), pleasurable when used (it doesn’t disturb the neighbors), and it looks
beautiful (futuristic, elegant).
The manufacture of goods themselves is increasingly automated. Labor costs
in the 1970s were a major consideration in factory location. That has declined as
factory automation has expanded. Husqvarna has production facilities in Europe,Design Capitalism 147
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148the US, Latin America and Asia. But the once pressing need for high-wage countries
to export factories now is being over-taken and outdated by the declining price of
the robots used in factory automation. As the unit price of automated machines
declines, factory location close to consumer markets becomes more of a consid-
eration than the cost of labor. But that then leaves advanced economies with a
puzzle: what does labor do in the future? This is not just a question for long-
standing leading economies. China is increasingly deploying robots in its fac-
tories.36 Its population is rapidly ageing, and its young people are less and less
interested in doing factory work.
Durable work with a long-term future is hence increasingly a function of
“design.” This proposition ought not to be taken too literally. It does not mean that
national labor forces are suddenly going to be swamped by “designers” in the
narrow occupational sense of that word. The most in-demand occupations in the
emergent auto-industrial era are transdisciplinary: they merge arts, science,
design, technology, and business disciplines. Transdisciplinary abilities are essen-
tial for future businesses, like running a 3D-printing start-up company, which
would require knowledge of digital fabrication tools and methods, computer
programming, and visual design. 3D printing’s small-run, prototyping style of
desktop fabrication is an auto-industrial technology that has a strong do-it-yourself
component and a model of value creation that revolves around design fused with
technology and mathematics.37 The ability to design and print objects large-and-
small in almost any material, embodying complex geometries, has enormous po-
tential for bespoke structures of all kinds including houses and multi-storey
buildings.
Additive manufacturing represents the power of design in a broad generic
sense.38 Yet design is also a speciﬁc occupation. Design as an occupational category
is growing in advanced economies. It is one of a minority of mid-tier, middle-
income job categories in the United States that has kept pace with the rate of
population growth. In the United States in the year 2000, there were 339,000 de-
signers; in 2014, there were 445,000, which represents a 30 percent increase over 15
years, compared with America’s 12 percent population growth over the same
period.39Design jobs—in the narrow occupational sense—are liable to continue to
grow steadily, whereas jobs like that of a health assistant, often cited as a growth
occupation of the future, are susceptible to automation. The argument that the
health assistant is a ‘high-touch’ social occupation, and as such immune from
automation, does not stand up to close scrutiny. Repetitive people jobs are just as
liable to be automated as repetitive paperwork jobs. It is work that is not repetitive
that will escape replacement by machines.
Design is resistant to automation because, at its core, it involves pattern
thinking and making. Durable future occupations will be those that produce,
interpret and apply patterns, shapes, and forms rather than if-then rules. Pattern-
work involves a broad spectrum of abilities, from high-concept thinking through
to everyday problem solving. It is rooted in the imagination. It relies on the double-
coding of the imagination. Alan Fletcher’s 1993 John Cage poster depicting a man
shouting “I have nothing to say and I am saying it” captures something of the double
entendre of the imagination from which wit, ideas, and the general capacity of
human beings to productively manage ambiguity arises. Patterns, shapes and
forms all interpolate opposites. They are built around contrasts: solid-and-void,
black-and-white, presence-and-absence, abundance-and-scarcity, above-and-below,
agreement-and-disagreement, entrance-and-exit, internal-and-external, frequent-
and-rare, hard-and-soft, and so on. A pattern or shape is created by the coalescence
of opposites. It is the subtle interaction of solid and void or internal and external
space that forms the pattern. The merging, union and combination of opposites isshe ji The Journal of Design, Economics, and Innovation Vol. 1, No. 2, Winter 2015
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Capitalism.”what the human imagination readily does. This cognitive capacity varies from in-
dividual to individual. At the high end of human experience, the fusion of oppo-
sites can be intense and exceptional. This is when the human mind creates
patterns. Some of these, the exceptional ones, are uncanny. They tap deeply into
the human imagination. They appear to us like a Cézanne landscape. This land-
scape painting presents a stony outcrop. We can see the clear ﬂinty outline of
rocks. At the same time the rocks seem to be liquid. They pour down from the
escarpment. The perceptible hard rock=liquid ﬂow motif epitomizes the human
imagination. All imagination, even the most trivial everyday problem-solving ex-
amples, seeks the epitome. It does not reach this state routinely, but in each case
there is a faint trace of the topological nature of the imagination.40
Topological cognition, which seeks some form of uncanny connection, is
different from human reason. Human reason is themodel for algorithmic machine
intelligence. The creative aspect of this is that artiﬁcial intelligence (AI) designers
began conceptually by ‘drawing’ an analogy between the human capacity for if-
then reasoning and a machine’s potential for programmed step-by-step intelli-
gence. There is a likeness between the two. Yet there is also an unlikeness between
imagination and reason. Accordingly, the conceptual design of the reasoning
machine relied on the kind of topological imagination that is denied to the ma-
chine. That same topological imagination is what allows human beings to conceive
interesting things. In this lies the core of a modern advanced economy. It is
necessary that activities and tools are efﬁcient and easy to use, utilize or perform.
But advanced economies have to achieve more than that. They must also create
interest-value. In doing so, they create demand.41 Objects and activities, services
and goods are interesting to the extent that they share in, even just a tiny amount,
the double-coding that takes place in the imagination. Not everything in the world
is interesting. Much of what we do and experience in life is not interesting. But
human satisfaction and gratiﬁcation, central to modern markets and economies,
rely on us being able to produce in varying degrees what is appealing and
stimulating.
As the auto-industrial age spreads its wings, the repetitious and rule-governed
aspects of production and distribution are being automated. The rapidly
approaching auto-industrial era is one that is characterized by self-service
computerization, digital platforms, artiﬁcial intelligence, robotics, people-less
factories, and a generally high degree of technological automation. Job markets as
we know them are being redeﬁned by this change. A large portion of existing non-
dexterous manual and rule-based ofﬁce work will be automated. Less clear is what
will replace the jobs that have been replaced; excepting that future types of work
will substitute patterns for rules. Patterns repeat; but not like rules. Where rules
guide humans and machines through repetitive if-then steps, patterns repeat an
act of creation. This is the act of equating void and solid, up and down, empty and
full, black and white. Patterns, designs, shapes and forms excite the human
imagination because they are subtle reminders of the primal act of creation. They
remind each of us what the imagination is capable of. That is satisfying. From such
satisfactions arise the demand for goods and services that embody ingenious pat-
terns. From this virtuous cycle emerges the economic dynamism of the modern
capitalist economy.Design Capitalism 149
